The revolutionary mommieland of all of Araby, Pyramidland, home of that fierce V checking Army and World HQ for the industrial horrific gendercidal Black Veil Brides complexes.
Currently featuring the ex Undying Pharaoh Hosni in a curious version of an ancient Alice In Chains tune, despite unassing the President For Lifer, things are still kinda iffy.
General Nasser’s pre Elvis period revolutional junta thing that brought Aegypt the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is still in charge, still violating the ‘fundamentals of due process” and still trying civies in military courts
Those accused include pro-democracy demonstrators, bloggers, and other prominent activists swept up in the chaos that preceded and followed Mubarak’s fall, as well as common criminals and bystanders. Thousands have been convicted and sentenced to terms of between several months and five years in prison.
The procedures tend to be swift and are conducted before single judges in military uniform who are not known for scrupulous attention to the evidence.
Parliamentary elections are scheduled for maybe like November – and since the Aegypt Armed Forces will in theory answer to an elected leader of sorts – Who all’s on the short list for Future Pharaohs?
El Baradei fights for a preliminary Bill of Rights for every electoral competition, and understands the weakness of the current situation as well as the army and police’s progressive loss of credibility. He confides in Tahrir square and is sincerely convinced that he will be chosen because of his “inclusive” character. According to the polls, however, he isn’t a favourite and it is possible that in the end he might not even run for office.
Amr Moussa works a familiarity with the media and cameras that has long been exercised in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and subsequently at the Arab League. There is fascinating discourse, a refined analysis of the mediterranean partnership and of the regional situation for which Moussa claims that the Arab wave will involve every country, even those who today feel safe. As it was already whispered a few months ago, the possibility of forging an alliance with the Ikhwan, which controls an electoral base of no more than 25%, has vanished. He appeals instead to 60% of Egyptians, those who can identify with a liberal economy with strong social correctives and presents himself as the natural candidate for a possible coalition; in fact, his aides and collaborators are active members in different parties.
Naguib Sawiris will not run in the presidential elections but it is difficult not to account for the opinion of one of the richest men in the country, the king of telecommunications, and the founder of the “Free Egyptians” party. A Coptic Xian by religion, but a laic by political choice. Without a large number of international observers – he comments – the impartiality of the electoral process and Egypt’s secularism risk being tainted, and the spirit of the Revolution could be irreparably betrayed. Sawiris encorages the West to “participate” in the construction of Egyptian politics: if everyone interferes – his reasoning goes – why shouldn’t you, who love Egypt and democracy, do it too? The agreement between the Ikhwan and the army will instead guarantee a restoration, a moderate islamisation still looking for the candidate that will insure the army’s political and economic power and give the Ikhwan societal control through their network of mosques and other religious organisations, especially outside big urban centres.
Mohamed Morsi, chairman of the “Justice and Development” party, a political spin-off of the Ikhwan, limits himself to demanding early elections in the name of the people’s will, but dodges the issue of laity in politics, a theme that he does not appear to fully grasp. He considers the work of the military and the current government to be irreproachable.